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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

A Survey of Symbolic Logic. C. I. LEWIS. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1918. Pp. iv + 406.

This work, which appeared among the Semi-centennial Publications of the University of California, fills an important hiatus in the literature of logistics and mathematical logic. These studies are of so recent an origin that there has been till now no opportunity to consolidate into a single treatise anything but their most simple and primitive aspects. Accordingly the student, after leaving the almost childishly simple Boolean algebra as presented in the writings of Couturat and del Ré, is immediately confronted with that forbidding monument of patience and research, the *Principia Mathematica* of Whitehead and Russell. He encounters an unfamiliar symbolism, new methods, and a most exacting standard of rigor. It is only after he has become proficient in this new field that he can discern the fundamental unity underlying the investigations of Boole, De Morgan, Peirce, and Schröder, on the one hand, and those of Frege, Whitehead, and Russell, on the other.

Professor Lewis has written a work that completely bridges over the gap between the old and the new. He treats the history of symbolic logic in an impartial and comprehensive way, slighting neither the founders of the classical theory nor the principal innovators of the present day. After a good résumé of the classical theory of equations and inequations, he proceeds to a parallel development of the foundations of the logic of propositions, propositional functions, and classes on the Boole-Peirce-Schröder basis and on that of the *Principia*, exhibiting both the formal identity of the two systems and the inadequacy of Peirce's enumerative method of defining universal and particular propositions in terms respectively of iterated logical multiplication and iterated logical addition. There is a mass of excellent detail work in this connection, so that this part of the book should prove useful as a glossary for those who desire to transfer statements from the Peirce symbolism to that of Russell and *vice versa*.

Chapter V is devoted to Professor Lewis's personal contribution to the subject—the calculus of strict implication. This valuable piece of work is here for the first time gathered together in a unified and definitive presentation. It unquestionably constitutes a legitimate alternative to the "material implication" of the earlier writers, but the reviewer does not consider that it has been definitely established that "strict implication" is not simply formal implication between propositional functions whose variability is suppressed.

The last chapter concerns the relations between logistic and

mathematics. The Russellian view is fairly expounded, but the author also develops a "heterodox" standpoint, from which both logicie and mathematics become a manipulation of symbols by a method of substitution whose laws can never be stated exhaustively in a symbolic form. This constitutes a perfectly just criticism of the part played by non-symbolic postulates in the *Principia*. Lewis is quite right in pointing out that the postulates of the *Principia* differ from other postulates in degree rather than in kind.

Among other things, Lewis contrasts the encyclopedic logistic of Peano, the deductive logistic of Russell, and the synthetic logistic of Royce, in which many types of order are obtained by the specification of a more general, inclusive order. A notion not introduced by Lewis, but worthy of comment in this connection, is that of categoricity with reference to a particular set of concepts, introduced into mathematics by R. L. Moore. Moore has pointed out that a non-categorical set of postulates may still completely determine the formal properties of some notion that may be obtained from the undefined terms. A set of very few postulates—even a set of no postulates at all—may thus determine a number of completely specified notions, if used in conjunction with the appropriate definitions. It is hence possible to build up a theory of order—that is, a logistic—based primarily or even exclusively on definitions instead of on postulates. This, I imagine, is more or less what the Royce logistic proposes, and what Mr. Lewis considers a promising alternative to more developed methods.

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The Field of Philosophy. JOSEPH ALEXANDER LEIGHTON. Second revised and enlarged edition. Columbus: R. G. Adams and Company. 1919. Pp. 475.

To write a satisfactory Introduction to Philosophy is no mean task. Those who have tried it will, I am sure, agree with me in this statement. Especially is it difficult in this period of the renewal of philosophy, when there is such an apparent diversity of opinion, when philosophy is like a vine full of sap sending tendrils in every direction.

There are two ways of approach to the study of philosophy, the historical and the analytic. I do not mean to assert that one of these ways must exclude the other, but only that one of them must dominate. Professor Leighton realizes that "the History of Philosophy should be a second course." Yet he is also aware that "a purely topical and systematic introduction fails to bring the student in contact with the great historical doctrines in other than the scrap-